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Navy, Modernized

a naval squadron led by U.S. Commodore
Matthew Perry forced the bakufu to sign
a treaty that ended national isolation by
allowing a consul-general to reside in Japan,
and Townsend Harris came to take up this
post in 1856. He demanded and got a
shogunal audience at which he extorted
a full-blown trade pact from bakufu leader
Ii Naosuke-just as China was suffering
defeat in the second. Opium War in 1858.
Ii signed the treaty, in a decision that countermanded the orders of the emperor in Kyoto,
not the emperor in Beijing. This defiant act
stirred up violent nationalistic opposition,
first among samurai from Mito domain, who
murdered Ii in 1860, and later throughout
the nation as well. In 1863, two other Nativist
hotbeds, the Choshii and Satsuma domains,
executed the expulsion edict that bakufu leaders had earlier rescinded, only to suffer a
sound trouncing at the hands of m.odern
Western armed forces. Random acts of violence against Westerners by individual
samurai also met a similar fate. These abject
failures persuaded younger samurai leaders
to admit the impossibility of "honoring the
emperor" and "expelling the barbarians," so
they took the step of disestablishing their
own class privileges and ending Tokugawa
bakufu rule so as to restore the imperial court
to power.
To sum up, by discrediting the Chinese
world order and tribute system abroad, and
by calling into question the bases of warrior
supremacy at home, Nativism provided
grounds for ethnic nationalism and imperial
sovereignty to emerge in Japan by the mid19th century. The key ideas in Nativism
were as follows:
1. The Japanese are.superior to all other
peoples for having spontaneously
revered a divine imperial dynasty
throughout history.
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2. Japan's emperor, not China's, invested
Tokugawa shoguns with ruling authority but did so on condition that they
uphold national isolation, which perforce meant preserving sovereignty
and territorial integrity.
3. That point required shOguns to expel
unauthorized foreigners who forced
their way into Japan and the ruling
warrior class to live up to its Bushido
ideology.
4. Failure on those counts would justify
ending bakufu rule and the warrior
class in the name of imperialloyalism,
and creating a new polity and a commoner conscript army better suited to
carrying out the preceding tasks.
Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi

See also: Ii Naosuke; Kokutai and Ultranationalism; Mito School; Perry, Matthew;
Sakoku; Tokugawa Bakufu Political System;
Toyotomi Hideyoshi.

Further Reading
Jansen, Marius. China in the Tokugawa World.
C:ambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1992.
Matsumoto, Shigeru. Motoori Norinaga.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1970.
Nakai, Kate Wildman. "The Naturalization
of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan."
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 40,
no. 1 (January 1980): 157-199.

Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi. Anti-foreignism
and Western Learning in Early-Modern
Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986.

Navy, Modernized (1868-1894)
Much like the modern Japanese army, the
Japanese navy in 1868 was hodgepodge of

268

I Navy, Modernized
men, equipment, and facilities. Although it
was initially subordinate to the army, the
government gradually centralized the navy,
updated its fleet, expanded shipbuilding
facilities initiated by the Tokugawa shOgunate, sent foreign students abroad for training,
and adopted and adapted the best practices
of Western countries to form the most efficient navy in East Asia, which even rivaled
some Western armadas.
During the early 17th century, the Tokugawa shogunate banned the construction of
ocean-going vessels and limited Japan's
interaction with Western countries. By the
1850s, the growing European presence in
the East Asian seas convinced the shogunate
to lift this ban. It called upon the large
domains-in particular, Satsull.1a, Choshil,
Kaga, and Tosa-to develop and expand
their costal defenses and naval technology.
This was a decentralized effort; the shogunate relied on the Dutch to build a naval training center in Nagasaki, sent students to
Holland for further training, and later turned
to the French for help. French representatives in Japan were enthusiastic partners
of the shOgunate, despite wavering support
back in France. The shogunate, under the
direction of Oguri Tadamasa and Kurimoto
Joun, invited the French engineer Francois
Verny, who had been building a shipyard in
China, to build facilities in Japan. Verny
chose Yokosuka as the location to build an
iron foundry, arsenal, and dry dock; construction began in 1865. The French also
opened a school in Yokosuka to train future
Japanese navy men, which included classes
in mathematics and French language. Satsuma, in contrast, purchased ships and arms
from the British.
By the Meiji Restoration (1868), the
domains mentioned previously possessed
between 5 and 12 steamships. Most of the
ships were obsolete by Western standards,

having few armaments and little power,
and, in many cases, represented nothing
more than glorified transport barges. One
American observer noted that Japan became
the market for Western countries looking to
sell their outdated ships. Naval considerations played little role in the fighting during
the Restoration. One of the shogunate's top
naval men, Katsu Kaishu, who negotiated
the capitulation of the Tokugawa forces,
turned over some of the Tokugawa ships to
the Satcha-Ied forces, while the rest were
commandeered by the Enomoto Takeaki.
Enomoto took the shogunate's remaining
fleet north to Hakodate, where he led a final
battle against SatcM troops. He eventually
surrendered, and returned the ships.
During the early Meiji period (18681912), concerns about a naval conflict with
Western countries gave way to a focus on
bolstering the Japanese army against invasion and possible domestic uprisings. Politics also favored the army's development
over the navy-many early naval officials
were former shogunate officials, including
those few who had any naval experience,
such as Katsu Kaishu and Enomoto. Both
men became navy ministers, but even they
lacked significant knowledge of the sea.
Still, the dearth of equipment and any
significant naval tradition meant that the
Meiji state could draw from a broad range
of Western naval philosophies and new
technologies. In 1870, the state officially
adopted the British navy as its model, sending students to Great Britain for training,
funding a British mission to Japan, and
translating British naval texts. The British
also helped the Japanese create a naval war
college, and acquired the first ships specifically built for the Japanese market, which
used the most recent technology.
The navy's importance grew during the
1880s. It received a larger share of the
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military budget and attracted greater attention from the Meiji oligarchs, especially
after SatcM men began to domifiate the top
navy positions. Several statesman, such as
Iwakura Tomomi, argued that a country's
standing in the world was displayed by its
navy's prowess-a position that represented
a shift from older naval concerns over
defense of the homeland to Japan as an
imperial player. New French naval developments continued to influence the Japanese
navy, especially a controversial organizational philosophy called the "Jeune Ecole."
Rather than the relying on bulky fleet
consisting of large warships, like the British
model, this French school of thought emphasized small to medium-sized ships armed
with light, fast-firing guns, especially torpedo ships. This model provided a solution
to Japan's financial weaknesses; it could
not afford a complete British-style fleet.
Even so, Japan never completely abandoned
its relationship with the British navy; in
1892, it purchased the Yoshino, the fastest
cruiser in the world at the time.
Administratively, the Japanese navy
finally became independent during the
1880s. Under the old British model, the top
navy minister was beholden to a civilian
bureaucracy; in contrast, the army followed
the Prussian model and staffed its bureaucracy with royalty and others with direct
links to the monarch. The state changed
this model, creating a nayy ministry that
maintained equal footing with the army.
This exacerbated competition between the
army and navy for the public's attention
and budget appropriations. One political
strategy on the navy's part was to encourage
a shared vision among ·citizens, businessmen, and politicians, to expand into the
South Pacific (called "Nan'yo") which
could become a place for migration, possible colonization, and adventure. The
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navy's attention southward rivaled the
army's push toward the Asian continent, a
source of tension that would never be
resolved.
On the eve of Japan's first modern wars
against China and Russia, the navy shifted
from a haphazard mix of obsolete Western
ships to one capable of defeating a navy as
large as Russia's. Japan's initial naval weaknesses did not, however, put it too far behind
the West; even during the 19th century, there
was no consensus about how a navy should
operate or how it should be equipped.
Japan's naval modernization reflected the
shifting trends in the West, allowing it to
catch up quickly.
Michael Wert
See also: Imperial Rescript for Soldiers and
Sailors; Iwakura Tomomi; Katsu Kaishu;
Russo-Japanese War; World War L
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New Guinea Campaign (March 8,
1942-September 13, 1945)
On January 23, 1942, Japanese forces under
Major General Horii Tomitaro invaded New
Britain, New Guinea, capturing Rabaul
from its Australian garrison, known as Lark
Force. Moving into mainland New Guinea
on March 8, Japanese forces then occupied

